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The Potential Role of 
an Employment Guarantee 
Scheme in Korea's Social 
Safety Net* 
Gary S. Fields* 
The Current Employment Insurance System 
Beginning in November 1997, the Republic of Korea underwent a devasta-
ting economic crisis. Declining macroeconomic conditions brought about 
major labor market disruptions in 1998: a quadrupling of unemployment, a 
fall of 9% in real wages, informalization of the remaining jobs, increased job 
insecurity, and rising poverty and inequality. Disadvantaged groups suffered 
a disproportionate impact. The result was not only economic misery but also 
social pain: increased homelessness, rising crime, heightened school 
dropouts, an accelerating divorce rate, and an overwhelming sense of social 
malaise. 
1999 marked a major turnaround for Korea. GDP grew by 10.7%, and real 
wages are growing apace. The unemployment rate is now less than half of its 
peak level. Women are again returning to the labor force and are finding 
employment. A sense of guarded optimism is returning to the Korean 
society. 
Nonetheless, important labor market problems remain (and social 
problems as well). The unemployment rate now is twice as high as it was 
before the crisis. But high unemployment is the tip of the proverbial iceberg. 
Income inequality is 15% higher and poverty is twice as high as before. 
This report is part of a larger study looking at Korea's social safety net and ways of 
improving it. One component of that larger study is an assessment of how the unemployment 
insurance (UI) component of the nation's Employment Insurance System (EIS) should be 
redesigned or supplemented. Official recommendations are contained in a Korea Labor 
Institute report "Supplementing Korea's Unemployment Insurance System." What follows are 
additional recommendations reflecting my own personal views and not those of KLI or any 
other institution. 
Cornell University, USA. 
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What Korea has is not just an "unemployment problem" but a more 
general "employment problem." (Fields, 1999) The unemployed are not the 
only ones who are suffering. Those who lost jobs and have become re-
employed in less good ones; those who have kept their old jobs and whose 
real earnings have declined; those who are employed as daily workers and 
temporary workers and who have fewer work days than before; and those 
who face precarious employment and earnings prospects - all these are part 
of Korea's employment problem too. 
Before the crisis, Korea had put into place an ambitious employment 
insurance system (EIS). The three components of this system are traditional 
unemployment insurance (UI), job training, and a job information service. 
Other elements of Korea's social safety net system include a Livelihood 
Protection Program for the poor, a Life Stabilization Fund for those 
unemployed whose assets fall below a certain level, public works jobs for 
the unemployed and for the spouses of low-wage workers, employment 
maintenance subsidies, support for venture enterprises, and many other 
smaller programs. 
Despite all that Korea has done, the nation's social protection system still 
has more holes than net. In 1999, there were 35.8 million Koreans aged 15 
and over. The average number of unemployed in any given month was 1.4 
million. Yet, in a typical month, just 0.1 million received unemployment 
benefits and 0.3 million participated in public works programs. 1.7 million 
Koreans received Livelihood Protection benefits at some time during 1999. 
Taken together, about 0.5 million unemployed had been covered by those 
assistance programs. 
It is important to be clear about the risk being faced. Unemployment 
insurance in Korea, as elsewhere, protects against the risk of income loss 
because of unemployment. To date, the system has protected against the risk 
of losing all of one's income because of the complete loss of job. The EIS 
provides people with a temporary income after they have been completely 
unemployed for two weeks. The broader risk, not yet covered in Korea, is 
unemployment because of a less-than-full work week. UI is not intended to 
be an income supplementation program for people who are working but 
earning little; rather, it provides those who are not working with a temporary 
income while they are searching for employment. Thus, the millions of 
Koreans who have suffered income losses while remaining in a job are 
excluded from the EIS. Economic growth and other programs are needed to 
take care of their problems. 
It is also important to adopt a guiding framework for the EIS. One 
possible model is social insurance. Under this model, in so far as possible, 
everyone in society pays in and all of the insured who become unemployed 
can collect. Under the social insurance model, benefits are limited only by 
the overall financial solvency of the system. 
A second model is the private account model. Private accounts can be 
publicly-run or publicly-mandated. In either case, the individual has his or 
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her own account. In the event of unemployment, the account balance can be 
drawn down to provide an income to the unemployed. Otherwise, the money 
belongs to the individual, to be used in some other way, e.g., for old age 
spending, home-buying, or medical expenses. Under this model, UI is a type 
of compulsory savings with self-insurance against unemployment. 
The third model is social assistance. Here, the nation taxes itself in order 
to provide benefits for the needy members of society. Under this model, 
benefits are means-tested - that is, beneficiaries must prove not just that they 
are unemployed but that they are poor in order to collect UI benefits. 
Korea's system has been set up on the social insurance model. I 
recommend that this model be continued. 
The next question is: Keeping the social insurance framework, what are 
the issues in providing the best unemployment insurance possible for Korea 
at the present time? Three concerns are central. 
The first is incomplete coverage. Only half of wage workers are insured 
by the UIS. 60% of employed people are wage workers. Therefore, only 
about 30% of working Koreans are insured by UIS. The first issue, then, is 
how to expand coverage so that more Koreans are insured against income 
losses due to unemployment. The paper prepared for this conference by Dr. 
Hur (2000) details a plan for doing this. 
The second concern is inadequacy of benefits. The problem is that in 
Korea, UI benefits replace only a fraction of workers' prior earnings, and the 
benefit duration is shorter than the typical spell of unemployment. The issue, 
then, is how to redesign the benefit formulas in order to provide better social 
insurance. The KLI report already mentioned (Korea Labor Institute, 2000) 
recommends doing this by extending the maximum benefit duration to 49 
weeks. 
The third concern is weaving a social safety net. The problem is that the 
employment insurance system, the livelihood protection program, and the 
other programs in Korea, taken together, still leave major gaps. Gaping holes 
would remain even if the Refined Employment Record-Keeping System 
recommended by Dr. Hur were to be enacted, permitting UI benefits to be 
paid to non-regular workers in the construction sector. Accordingly, the next 
section of this report proposes that the gaps be filled further by creating an 
Employment Guarantee Scheme as a second pillar of the unemployment 
insurance component of the EIS. 
Before proceeding, let it be noted that financing is apparently not an issue. 
KLI studies conclude that the EIS is on sound financial footing, even after 
the IMF Crisis. Alternative financing arrangements are not likely to be 
enacted any time soon, and so that issue is not addressed in this report. 
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A Proposed Employment Guarantee Scheme for Korea 
Key Features 
In order for the nation to provide all workers with social insurance against 
the risk of income loss due to unemployment, I propose a second pillar of 
the Employment Insurance System. This new pillar is an Employment 
Guarantee Scheme for Korea (EGS). This new scheme would be a formal 
part of the EIS and would work alongside traditional unemployment 
insurance as follows. 
As its name implies, an Employment Guarantee Scheme would consist of 
public works jobs, offered on a daily basis to all who want them. Under this 
proposal, anybody who is unemployed and wants to receive a day's benefit 
in exchange for doing a day's work would be eligible for an EGS job. There 
would be no requirement of having worked previously, no prior contributory 
period, and no limitation on the duration of benefits. All who are 
unemployed - including daily workers, temporary workers, new entrants, re-
entrants and anybody else who might be interested - would be eligible, with 
one important exception: because the EGS would be Pillar 2 of the EIS, no 
worker currently receiving UI benefits under Pillar 1 would be eligible for 
EGS benefits under Pillar 2. 
Under such a scheme, establishing eligibility is not an issue. Doing a 
day's work would qualify the participant to receive a benefit at the end of the 
day. In other words, the work performed is itself prima facie evidence that 
the worker is deserving of benefits. 
What would be an appropriate wage to set? International experience has 
shown that guaranteed jobs cannot be too remunerative, otherwise workers 
will prefer the EGS jobs over private sector jobs. High EGS wages would 
result either in a very large and expensive system, or else the employment 
guarantee feature of the system would have to be sacrificed in order to 
maintain financial solvency. The solution that has been found to work in 
other countries is to set the wage for the EGS at below-market-levels - in the 
case of Korea, the national minimum wage might be an appropriate amount 
- so that only those who cannot find more attractive jobs elsewhere in the 
economy would opt for the guaranteed jobs. In this way, the EGS would be 
self-targeting, so that those with poor market opportunities, and only those 
people, would participate in the EGS. 
The jobs themselves should be designed so that EGS participants will 
perform socially useful tasks. The work sites would have to be dispersed 
throughout the country, otherwise the guarantee aspect of the job does not 
have much meaning. Still, in the best of circumstances, it may be necessary 
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for workers to have to travel considerable distances in order to get to where 
the jobs are. 
The EGS would replace Korea's current system of public works. Public 
works were the largest single expenditure item for social protection for the 
unemployed in Korea in 1999, covering an average of 300,000 participants 
per month. 
The new EGS would differ from the existing public works system in 
several respects. First, it would be open to everyone except for persons 
currently receiving UI benefits; the present system, by contrast, has a 
detailed selection process. Second, it would be a guarantee scheme; the 
present system is not. Third, jobs would be offered for a period as short as a 
day; the present system provides continuing, ongoing jobs lasting as long as 
several months. And finally, the benefits would be below the minimum 
wage level; the current system pays benefits at or above the minimum wage. 
(This last feature would have to be carefully explained as a way of enabling 
the country to afford to offer guaranteed employment on even a daily basis.) 
Because the EGS will be a central part of the nation's system of social 
insurance and will have to be regarded as such, the benefits will need to be 
paid for by the larger society. Participants would make their contributions in 
kind by contributing a day's work in exchange for a day's wage, which will 
have to come from other sources. One possibility would be to levy a tax on 
"regular" employers; the justification for this would be that is their failure to 
create full employment that is creating the need for an EGS in the first place. 
Another possibility is to pay for the benefits out of general revenues, on the 
grounds that it is society's responsibility to assure earning opportunities to all 
of its citizens. 
Lessons from International Experience with Public 
Works Programs 
As the details are worked out, the Korean authorities will be able to draw on 
much relevant international experience. Such public works programs to 
create employment for the poor have been established in the Maharashtra 
state of India, the principal city of which is Mumbai (formerly Bombay), as 
well as in Argentina, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Chile, Honduras, Cape Verde, 
and Botswana. 
Lipton (1998) has conducted a thorough review of these programs and 
recommended the following design features: design employment for low 
opportunity cost individuals; seek alternatives to direct targeting; use 
scheme rules and conditions to discriminate for the poor; allow for poor 
workers' frequent physical difficulties; minimize poor participants' 
transactions costs; reduce covariate stresses on public works resources; use 
retailer, employer, and public works competition 'for the poor'; before 
starting, check that low demand for labor causes poverty; subsidize coverage, 
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sustainability, and graduation; encourage grassroots pressure groups to 
improve the scheme; seek complementarities among employment schemes; 
build up capacity of schemes and workers before works begin; and use 
performance incentives for officials and participants. 
Another source of guidance is the World Bank's forthcoming World 
Development Report 2000/2001, which reaches the following conclusions. 
O The wage rate should be determined by the local market wage for 
unskilled labor, not by the program's budget. 
• Using additional eligibility criteria for screening is to be avoided. 
O Wage schedules should be gender neutral. 
O Labor intensity should be higher than the local norm for similar projects. 
n Communities should be involved in project selection to derive 
maximum benefit from the infrastructure created. 
O To maximize risk mitigation effects, the program should be available at 
all times, expanding automatically during crises, as demand increases. 
A final aspect, not touched upon in either of these reviews, is a 
technological one. When this new system is created, it would be an ideal 
opportunity to introduce Smart Cards. Smart Cards are small cards like 
credit cards or bank automatic teller machine cards which are embedded 
with computer chips that can be written on. These are used, for example, 
throughout France as debit cards and throughout much of Europe as 
telephone cards, where they complement and more often replace coin 
telephones. The bus card used in the Seoul metropolitan area is similar to a 
Smart Card. 
Making EGS payments to Korean workers by Smart Card would have a 
number of advantages. It would get Korean workers accustomed to dealing 
with Smart Cards. It would assure that workers who receive benefits under 
Pillar 2 would not simultaneously receive benefits under Pillar 1 - these 
benefits would also be paid by Smart Card. It would enable the Ministry of 
Labor to track usage of EGS jobs person by person. And it would reduce the 
scope for misappropriation of funds by local EGS administrators. 
Diagnosis and Principal Recommendations 
In my view, Korea's unemployment insurance system has three major 
problems. First, despite recent extensions, coverage remains quite incom-
plete. Second, even if all wage workers were to be brought into the system, a 
large proportion of Koreans would remain without social protection. And 
third, the maximum duration of benefits is shorter than the typical spell of 
unemployment. 
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This diagnosis leads to three major policy suggestions. First, because 
temporary and daily workers face serious risks of unemployment and are not 
now covered by the current UIS, coverage should be extended to this group. 
In order to be able to do this, a new Refined Employment Record-Keeping 
System (RERS) has been recommended. 
Second, even if the UIS were extended to include temporary and daily 
workers, there would still be important groups who would be left out of the 
social protection system. These include some regular workers (government 
workers and teachers), the self-employed, new entrants and reentrants to the 
labor force, and those out of the labor force. In order to include those now 
excluded, it has been recommended that Korea create an Employment 
Guarantee Scheme (EGS) that offers an assured job to all who wish to work. 
And third, because UI benefits do not last long enough to cover a typical 
spell of unemployment, benefit duration should be extended. It has been 
estimated that with current financing rates and coverage ratios, the system 
could afford benefits lasting as long as 49 weeks (Korea Labor Institute, 
2000). 
However, I would not recommend that benefits be extended to this length 
for two reasons. First, the EIS needs to protect itself against a serious future 
adverse shock, such as occurred in the 1997/98 financial crisis. Second, part 
of the current surplus would be better used, I think, to extend benefits to 
those who do not now receive them rather than lengthening benefits for 
those now covered. Accordingly, I recommend that the surplus funds in the 
EIS be used in part to extend the maximum benefit duration and in part to 
finance an Employment Guarantee Scheme. 
This combination of measures - extension of EIS coverage to temporary 
and daily workers, a second pillar guaranteeing public works jobs to all who 
want them, and longer benefit duration for the insured unemployed - would 
make major contributions to Korea's social insurance system. In addition to 
providing more substantial benefits to workers now insured who become 
involuntarily unemployed, the expanded UIS would also cover daily and 
temporary workers, the self-employed, new entrants and re-entrants to the 
labor force, and the re-unemployed. 
Still left out would be the old, the sick, and the infirm. For them, what is 
needed is an expanded livelihood protection program, guaranteeing an 
escape from poverty. Such a program has already been promised for October 
2000 and is now being implemented. 
If this proposal were enacted, Korea would have a social insurance 
scheme with three major components: the current unemployment insurance 
system, extended to cover more wage and salary workers; an employment 
guarantee scheme for all who are capable of working; and an anti-poverty 
program for all, whether capable of working or not. The result would be a 
true social safety net for the first time in Korea's history. This would be a 
great national achievement. 
